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Abstract: Efforts and programs toward aiding sustainable development in less affluent countries are
primarily driven by the moral imperative to relieve and to prevent suffering. This utilitarian principle has
provided the moral basis for humanitarian intervention and development aid initiatives worldwide for the
past decades. It takes a short term perspective which shapes the initiatives in characteristic ways. While
most development aid programs succeed in their goals to relieve hunger and poverty in ad hoc situations,
their success in the long term seems increasingly questionable, which throws doubt on the claims that
such efforts qualify as sustainable development. This paper aims to test such shortfall and to find some
explanations for it. We assessed the economic development in the world's ten least affluent countries by
comparing their ecological footprints with their biocapacities. This ratio, and how it changes over time,
indicates how sustainable the development of a country or region is, and whether it risks ecological
overshoot. Our results confirm our earlier findings on South-East Asia, namely that poor countries tend to
have the advantage of greater sustainability. We also examined the impact that the major development aid
programs in those countries are likely to have on the ratio of footprint over capacity. Most development aid
tends  to  increase  that  ratio,  by  boosting  footprints  without  adequately  increasing biocapacity.  One
conceptual explanation for this shortfall on sustainability lies in the Conventional Development Paradigm,
an ideological construct that provides the rationales for most development aid programs. According to the
literature, it rests on unjustified assumptions about economic growth and on the externalization of losses in
natural capital. It also rests on a simplistic version of utilitarianism, usually summed up in the principle of
'the greatest good for the greatest number'. We suggest that a more realistic interpretation of sustainability
necessitates a revision of that principle to 'the minimum acceptable amount of good for the greatest
sustainable number'. Under that perspective, promoting the transition to sustainability becomes a sine qua
non condition for any form of 'development'. 
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1. Introduction
Following the dominant convention in the literature,
we  define  development  as  multidimensional
innovation or growth that achieves positive outcomes
for  the  quality  of  human  lives  and/or  for  human
security.  It  can  manifest  in  the  areas  of  financial
income,  employment,  distribution  of  wealth,
education, political autonomy, basic needs for survival,
health of populations and ecosystems, equality, self-
esteem  and  dignity,  and  freedom  [1].  The  latter
includes  Sen's  [2]  standard  of  individual  capability.
Those  areas  cover  people's  social,  biological,  and
economic environments and have been recognised as
the  main  indicators  contributing  to  the  human
development index [3] and human security index [4].
Sustainable  development,  then,  includes  any  such
innovation or growth that does not compromise the
ability  of  future  generations  to  develop  along  the
same  lines  ([5],  p.  2).  This  corresponds  to  the
definition  by  the  World  Conservation  Union (IUCN),
"improving the quality of human life while living within
the carrying capacity of supporting ecosystems" ([6],
p.  6).  Thus,  sustainability  is  all  about  avoiding  to
transgress systemic limits.
The above listed areas in which development can
manifest  suggest  directly  some ethical  reasons  why
affluent  countries  engage  in  international
development aid: When the citizens of a poor country
suffer  deprivations  in  those  areas,  and  their  own
government and communities are not in a position to
alleviate  their  situation,  international  aid  seems
indicated  for  several  moral  reasons.  One  of  those
reasons,  though  rarely  explicated,  is  self  interest.
Helping  a  country  develop  into  a  valuable  trading
partner and enabling that country to purchase goods
and services  from the donor  country (so-called tied
aid)  are in  the obvious national  self  interest  of  the
donor. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness [7]
paved the way for development aid to become untied,
broadly coordinated among donors, and designed and
implemented  by  the  recipient  countries.  But
oftentimes  political  and  strategic  considerations  still
dominate the allocation decisions [8]. 
Much  more  widely  advertised  is  the  utilitarian
motivation,  under  which  helping  a  sufficiently  large
group of people transcend a situation that caused them
to suffer inordinate deprivations, at only minor sacrifice
to  the  donor,  provides  the  necessary  and  sufficient
justification for aid. Likewise, deontological and virtue-
based ethics recognise a duty to relieve suffering, often
manifesting  in  the  mission  statements  of  charitable
organisations both religious and secular. Arguments in
support  of  that duty often invoke human rights and
basic  needs.  In  practice,  such  humanitarian  motives
tend to focus on situations where the deprivation is
most easily quantified, as in cases where populations
experience  extreme  poverty,  unemployment,  under-
education, poor health, or homelessness. 
The basic and widely shared agreement underlying
these  ethical  motives  is  that  knowledge  of  human
suffering  implies  a  duty  to  actively  help.  Much less
general  agreement  is  found  when  it  comes  to
choosing the  most  appropriate  ways  to  help.  Short
term  relief  measures  dominate  in  cases  of  natural
disasters  such  as  the  2010  Haiti  earthquake  which
displaced  about  2.3  million  Haitians  (almost  one
quarter of the total population) and killed or injured
over half a million. The UN's relief program focuses on
the  restoration  of  the  island's  economy  and  public
health [9]. 
Designed  as  immediate  disaster  relief,  it  largely
ignores  how  the  island's  climate,  soil  conditions,
environmental  trends,  and  population  dynamics
constrain  its  long  term  prospects  for  development.
Those  issues  are  considered  beyond  the  program's
time  horizon  and  beyond  its  goals  of  providing
immediate relief. In other words, international disaster
relief  is  seldom  justified  by  arguments  invoking
sustainability, nor would many suggest that it needs
to  be.  This  sets  it  apart  from  international
development aid where the absence of  a long-term
focus  can  raise  considerable  problems,  as  we  will
explain presently.
2. Disaster Relief and Development Aid
The  short  term  humanitarian  priorities  in  disaster
relief often seem relatively straightforward, suggesting
unequivocally not only the need for immediate action
but  also  what  choices  of  aid  measures  might  be
indicated. Yet, as soon as the time frame is extended
to the medium and long term, those choices become
more  debatable.  This  is  most  evident  in  cases  of
famine relief. For example, Peter Singer [10] considers
the relief of human suffering to be a paramount moral
duty;  he  argued  that  a  famine  always  demands
immediate  food  aid  from  any  who  are  reasonably
able.  Arguing  on  the  same  humanitarian  and
utilitarian grounds, Garret Hardin [11] comes to the
opposite conclusion, that famine relief in the form of
food donations would be the worst anybody could do
to  a  poor  country.  Because  it  promotes  population
growth without addressing the reasons for the famine,
it  will  only  cause  worse famines  in  years  to  come.
Both  Singer  and  Hardin  agree  that  family  planning
and contraception programs must be included in any
such relief program. Curiously, neither author engages
with deontological or virtue-based rationales for aid,
which  emphasise  the  charitable  act  as  a  duty
independent of consequentialist considerations.
The difference between the  two positions  lies  of
course in the time frame and the preferred balance
between the strategies of short-term alleviation versus
long-term prevention.  As it  turns out,  Singer's view
usually  carries  the  day  with  many  relief  programs,
except that family planning is seldom included as an
integral part [12,13]. That omission again underscores
4
the short term perspective taken by such programs.
Yet the conflict between the two strategies points to
an ethical dilemma. One wonders just how severe the
suffering  and  misery  must  be  before  we  ought  to
ignore  potential  long-term  complications,  or  how
disastrous  the  long-term consequences  of  the  relief
action must be to justify the withholding of aid. 
In the case of disaster relief we see no room for
justifiable compromise; its concerns lie by definition in
the  short  term,  amounting  to  moral  blinkers.  The
challenge  of  finding  appropriate  compromises
becomes  much  more  pressing  where  it  regards
programs for  development aid which pursue explicit
aims  that  extend  into  the  medium  and  long  term
future. We would expect such programs to be guided
primarily  by  considerations  of  long  term  benefits
which would logically include sustainability if the time
horizon is not specified. Thus, as long as the goals of
a development program are not delimited in time, that
development  is  automatically  governed  by  the
constraints of sustainability. Conversely, a program or
initiative  that  promotes  evidently  unsustainable  end
states should come with clear temporal demarcations
and  disclaimers  abrogating  any  responsibility  for
consequences that might ensue beyond those dates.
We  base  those  expectations  on  the  ideals  of
beneficence and veracity that inform the professional
codes  of  conduct  of  development  workers  and
academics. In this study we examined to what extent
major  development  programs  live  up  to  those
expectations.
3. Method
Among  the  many  programs  at  the  national  and
international  levels  that  all  share  the  label  of
sustainable  development,  international  development
aid tends to benefit from a supranational perspective
and a grounding in scientific analyses of needs and
potentials.  Rather  than  attempting  to  gauge  the
successes of individual programs we chose to examine
the cumulative and synergistic outcomes occurring in
their  most  deserving recipients,  the  world's  poorest
developing  countries.  We  selected  our  sample
countries on the basis of their rankings on the Human
Development Index [3] and the Human Security Index
[4]. Countries that scored low on both indices not only
receive rather a lot of development aid, in many cases
they  represent  situations  that  render  development
fundamentally  imperative  on  humanitarian  grounds.
Development in this case is hardly a whimsical option
but the only defensible course of action. Yet, unlike
disaster relief, these programs explicitly pursue long-
term  goals.  The  question  is:  what  shape  do  their
strategies take, stopgap or long term? 
In  order  to  maximise  the  chances  of  those
development  efforts  to  achieve  their  objectives  we
excluded from our sample  of  poorest  countries  any
that showed a failed states index (FSI) greater than
100,  which  includes  the  top  thirteen  [14].  Failing
states  are  unlikely  to  provide  the  minimum
requirements of infrastructure and political stability for
successful  development.  In  other  words,  they  need
more  than  the  average  kind  of  development  aid,
ranging from peace keeping to broad social  reform,
often  supported  by  armed  intervention.  Because  of
recent destabilising developments,  Mali  was omitted
from the sample in the revised version of this paper.
A program for sustainable development based on a
genuine  long  term  perspective  would  seek  either  to
ensure the sustainable flourishing of the economy and of
human well-being, or  to pave the way for  a smooth
transition  towards  more  sustainable  structures  and
practices.  The  extent  to  which  a  country  operates
sustainably can be estimated by comparing its citizens'
average  ecological  footprint  (reflecting  its  demand  of
resources and its ecological impact) with the amount of
biocapacity  available  for  each  citizen  (reflecting  its
resources and ecosystem services, also referred to as
natural capital) [15-17]. Based on a previous report [18]
we use the country's sustainability quotient or SQ—the
ratio of per capita ecological footprint over its available
per capita biocapacity. An SQ of less than 1 indicates
sustainability while greater than one indicates ecological
overshoot [19]. The data are summarised in Table 1.
To assess the development of the sample countries
for  its  sustainability  we  identified  a  major
development  aid  program for  each country,  verified
that  it  explicitly  named  sustainable  development
among its aims, and examined its major strategies for
their  effects  on  the  country's  biocapacity  factors
(bioproductive  area  and  bioproductivity)  and  on  its
ecological  footprint  drivers  (population  growth,
consumption  of  goods  and  services  per  person,
footprint  intensity;  [19],  p.  41).  The  sum of  those
effects would cause its SQ to either rise or fall. The
trend by which the SQ changes over time indicates
how  sustainable  the  development  of  a  country  or
region is, and whether the risk of ecological overshoot
is  increasing  or  decreasing.  Where  possible  we
selected grant  programs over loan programs as the
former  contribute  to  Third  World  debt  which  itself
contributes  significantly  to  unsustainable  practices
(such  as  the  replacement  of  food  crops  with
exportable cash crops). The findings are summarised
in Table 2. 
5
Table 1. Eleven of the world's poorest countries are compared to the European Union and the world
average in their extent of sustainability. Example: Each citizen of Eritrea uses the equivalent of 0.9 global
hectares to sustain their livelihood; the country of Eritrea has 1.6 global hectares of bioproductive land to
offer to each citizen; this results in an SQ of 0.563, meaning that Eritreans live within the carrying capacity
of their land. Sources: [19,20].
Country Ecol FP
(gha per person)
Biocapacity
(gha per person)
SQ HDI ranking
Max = 187
HSI ranking
Max = 232
Burkina Faso 1.3 1.3 1.0 181 210
Burundi 0.9 0.5 1.8 185 225
Eritrea 0.9 1.6 0.563 177 218
Ethiopia 1.1 0.7 1.571 174 221
Guinea-Bissau 1.0 3.2 0.31 176 208
Liberia 1.3 2.5 0.52 182 229
Mozambique 0.8 1.9 0.421 184 198
Niger 2.3 2.1 1.10 186 222
Rwanda 1.0 0.6 1.67 166 220
Sierra Leone 1.1 1.2 0.92 180 224
Togo 1.0 0.6 1.67 162 219
European Union (27) 2.7–8.3
Eur. Av. 4.8
1.0–12.5
Eur. Av. 2.2
0.494–6.023
Eur. Av. 2.2
3–55 2–71
World 2.7 1.8 1.5 1–187 1–232
4. Finding: 'Sustainable Development' Is Often 
Neither
Table 1 lists the state of sustainability in eleven of the
world's  poorest  countries,  compared to  the  EU and
the  world  average.  The  distribution  of  SQ  values
shows  six  countries  operating  sustainably—i.e.
drawing only on the interest from their natural capital.
The other  six  have  exceeded their  sustainable  limit
and are drawing on both principal  and interest. Yet
only four of those SQ values match the world average,
and  none  of  them  comes  close  to  the  kind  of
overshoot exemplified by the European average of 2.2
(2003) or the US value of 2.1 (2007) [20].
The data confirm our earlier findings on South-East
Asian countries [18], as well as global surveys [20],
namely  that  poor  countries  tend  to  have  the
advantage of greater sustainability except in cases of
excessive  population  size.  In  those  cases  ecological
overshoot occurs in spite of small per capita footprints
because the biocapacity resources are shared among
too large a population, resulting in rampant poverty,
often  aggravated  by  post-colonial  legacies  of
inequitable  power  structures  and  mismanagement.
Those examples (in our sample, Burundi, Rwanda and
Togo, and to a lesser extent Ethiopia) show that the
SQ  says  nothing  about  a  country's  level  of
development;  it  only  indicates  how  sustainably  it
operates.
In  contrast  to  those  high  SQ  countries,  many
developing  countries  with  smaller  populations  show
considerable potential  to achieve the transition to  a
sustainable  economy,  aided  by  the  fact  that  their
natural capital has not yet been greatly reduced [19].
In  our  sample,  those  would  be  Niger  and  Burkina
Faso. Suitable development aid could provide crucial
support  at  the  right  time  to  make  that  transition
possible before further population growth removes it
beyond the horizon.
The  remaining  countries  in  our  sample  (Eritrea,
Guinea-Bissau,  Liberia,  Mozambique,  and  Sierra
Leone) show SQ values below 1.0, indicating that they
are conducting their  affairs  sustainably for  the time
being. This encouraging finding needs to be evaluated
in the light of the abject poverty that abounds in all of
them.  This  means  that  the  state  of  sustainability
represents  only  one of  several  necessary  conditions
for human security and well-being. Moreover, their low
SQ does not necessarily indicate that these countries
have more resources to offer those poor multitudes;
more  likely  their  excess  productivity  is  exported
abroad to support other countries' overshoot. Yet, low
SQ  also  indicates  a  significant  opportunity  for
development aid—the chance that with the right kind
of support  those countries  could  remain sustainable
while still relieving their poverty. The question is: are
they likely to receive such support?
This leads to the problem posed by the dynamics of
the situation. The SQ values in Table 1 only provide
snapshots  in  time;  they  say  nothing  about  the
directions in which those countries are developing. An
indication about probable changes for each country is
given by its major source of development aid. Table 2
lists one major donor program for each country in the
sample, along with its stated goals and the resulting
ramifications on footprints and biocapacities. The data
suggest a slim chance for an affirmative answer to the
question raised in the preceding paragraph.
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Table 2: For each of the eleven countries listed in Table 1, a m
ajor source of developm
ent aid is exam
ined for its goals and its objectives regarding footprint
and
 biocapacity. In
 cases w
here no
 explicit objectives w
ere given, probable consequences are stated. Sources are: a) Burkina D
evelopm
ent Partnership.
http://w
w
w
.burkinadevelopm
entpartnership.org/index.php?id=
4
 (accessed
 on
 2
 M
arch 
2013); b) Burundi: D
evelopm
ent &
 Cooperation
 –
 Europeaid.
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/w
here/acp/country-cooperation/burundi/burundi_en.htm
 (accessed on 2 M
arch 2013); c) Eritrea – U
N
 D
evelopm
ent Assistance
Fram
ew
ork. http://w
w
w
.er.undp.org/un_eritrea/docs/undaf_pub_eritrea.pdf (accessed
 on
 2
 M
arch
 2013); d) D
evelopm
ent W
ithout Freedom
. http://w
w
w
.
hrw
.org/sites/default/files/reports/ethiopia1010w
ebw
cover.pdf (accessed
 on
 2
 M
arch
 2013); e) Ethiopia: Sustainable
 D
evelopm
ent and
 Poverty Reduction
Program
 (SD
PRP). http://siteresources.w
orldbank.org/IN
TPRS1/Resources/Ethiopia_APR2-PRSP(M
arch2005).pdf (accessed
 on
 2
 M
arch
 2013); f) G
uinea-
Bissau:
 
D
evelopm
ent
 
&
 
Cooperation
 
–
 
Euopeaid.
 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/w
here/acp/country-cooperation/guinea-bissau/guinea-bissau_en.htm
(accessed
 on
 2
 M
arch
 2013); g) D
ocum
ent de
 stratégie
 pays
 et program
m
e
 indicatif national pour la
 période
 2008-2013. http://ec.europa.eu/
developm
ent/icenter/repository/scanned_gw
_csp10_fr.pdf (accessed
 on
 2
 M
arch
 2013); h) H
istory
 of U
SAID
 in
 Liberia. http://liberia.usaid.gov/node/82
(accessed on 2 M
arch 2013); i Projects of G
erm
any. http://41.220.166.65/reports/donors/12 (accessed on 2 M
arch 2013); j)Com
m
ission proposes to gradually
resum
e developm
ent aid to the Republic of N
iger. http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=
IP/10/1004&
form
at=
H
TM
L&
aged=
0&
language=
EN
&
guiLanguage=
en
 (accessed
 on
 2
 M
arch
 2013); k)
 Country
 Context. http://w
eb.undp.org/evaluation/docum
ents/AD
R/AD
R_Reports/Rw
anda/ch2-
AD
R_Rw
anda.pdf (accessed
 on
 2
 M
arch
 2013); l) D
FID
 Sierra
 Leone
 –
 O
perational Plan
 2011-2015. http://w
w
w
.dfid.gov.uk/D
ocum
ents/publications1/
op/sierra-leone-2011.pdf (accessed on 2 M
arch 2013); m
) Togo Country Strategy Paper 2011-2015. http://w
w
w
.afdb.org/fileadm
in/uploads/afdb/D
ocum
ents/
Project-and-O
perations/Togo-CSP%
202011-2015%
20(3)%
20Full%
20Final.pdf (accessed on 2 M
arch 2013).
C
oun
try
M
ajor Source of 
D
evelopm
ent A
id
G
oals of D
evelopm
ent P
rogram
Stated objectives regarding 
footprint
Stated objectives regarding 
biocapacity
Burkina Faso
BF D
evelopm
ent 
Partnership
Basic education, 
Sm
all business developm
ent
'G
et out of poverty'
N
one
Burundi 
European D
evelopm
ent 
Fund (ED
F)
'Rural rehabilitation, health and general 
budget support'; agricultural 
developm
ent
'Reduce poverty and return to 
sustainable developm
ent'
Biodiversity and environm
ental quality 
are included am
ong aim
s
Eritrea
U
N
 D
evelopm
ent 
Assistance Fram
ew
ork 
(U
N
D
AF)
Basic social services; M
D
G
s; food 
security; 'em
ergency &
 recovery'; 
gender equity;
'Enhance productivity, export 
expansion, and trade and 
investm
ent in high potential grow
th 
sectors'
M
D
G
 7: environm
ental sustainability is 
m
entioned but not explained
Ethiopia
W
orld Bank SD
PRP; 
Ethiopia is a m
ajor 
recipient of aid; also a 
m
ajor failure;
Agricultural grow
th and food security; 
accelerating private sector grow
th; 
strengthening of public institutions
Econom
ic grow
th is em
phasized
Agricultural productivity to increase; but 
food aid hinders.
G
uinea-Bissau
European D
evelopm
ent 
Fund (ED
F)
Infrastructure developm
ent, conflict 
prevention, w
ater safety, energy 
sources, econom
ic grow
th
M
ost objectives contribute to an 
increase of the footprint
Strengthening biodiversity in the coastal 
region is am
ong the projects
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Table 2: Cont.
C
oun
try
M
ajor Source of 
D
evelopm
ent A
id
G
oals of D
evelopm
ent P
rogram
Stated objectives regarding 
footprint
Stated objectives regarding 
biocapacity
Liberia
U
SAID
Sustainable developm
ent in political 
structure and education, agriculture, 
infrastructure &
 energy
M
ost objectives appear neutral 
tow
ard the footprint
Renew
able energy sources are to be 
developed
M
ozam
bique
G
erm
any—
Federal 
M
inistry for Econom
ic 
Cooperation and 
D
evelopm
ent
43 projects on education, 
adm
inistration, H
IV/AID
S control, 
transport &
 infrastructure, 'sustainable 
econom
ic developm
ent'
Increase of em
issions is likely
Im
proved education likely to decrease 
reproductive rate;
N
iger
EuropeAid—
European 
D
evelopm
ent Fund 
(ED
F)
H
ealth care, transport, social protection 
&
 developm
ent (sm
all business)
Im
proved roads are likely to result 
in increased em
issions
Reproductive health and rights are likely 
to decrease population grow
th
Rw
anda
W
orld Bank
M
D
G
s, national reconciliation, econom
ic 
grow
th, poverty reduction, increased 
life expectancy
M
ost objectives contribute to an 
increase of the footprint through 
increased consum
ption
H
igh population density and 
environm
ental deterioration are not 
being addressed
Sierra Leone
U
K—
D
epartm
ent for 
International 
D
evelopm
ent
'M
acroeconom
ic stability', increased 
revenue base, increased foreign 
investm
ent, econom
ic grow
th
Footprint is likely to increase 
significantly
N
one
Togo
African D
evelopm
ent 
Bank &
 African 
D
evelopm
ent Fund
G
ood governance; infrastructure; 
regional trade; agricultural sector
Road building is likely to increase 
em
issions; 'econom
ic grow
th' to 
increase footprint
Agricultural productivity to increase
8
Even considering that each country receives aid from
multiple  other  donors,  the  data  indicate  that  these
particular  donors  have  not  fully  understood  the
challenge. Of even greater concern is the fact that if
development  aid  tends  to  fail  in  the  cases  of  those
sustainable  countries  by  not  preventing  them  from
slipping into overshoot, it is even less likely to succeed
in the cases of unsustainable countries in helping them
reduce  it.  This  reinforces  critiques  that  point  to
widespread failures of development aid in other areas
besides sustainability [21].
The  findings  also  raise  the  question  about  the
possible impact that this development aid could have
on  the  sample  countries,  in  relation  to  their  own
domestic investments. For the countries with SQ values
greater than 1.0, the total development aid received in
2011 ranges from 3.5% of GDP (Ethiopia) to 10.8% of
GDP  (Burundi)  [22,23].  For  the  countries  in  the
sustainable group those percentages range from 3.8
(Eritrea) to 8.1 (Sierra Leone), except for Liberia which
received aid amounting to 35.9% of GDP. In the latter
case  certainly  the  specific  development  projects
sponsored  by  the  aid  can  be  expected  to  exert  a
significant  effect  on the future state  of  sustainability
status  of  the entire  country.  But  even for  the other
countries in the sample the lower impact of aid does
not mean that its effects will be negligible.
The main issue addressed by this paper, however, is
not the projected impact of aid but to what extent aid
projects  labeled  as  sustainable  development  deserve
that  label.  Having  established  that  sustainability  is
hardly prevalent among the probable outcomes of the
development  programs  in  our  sample,  the  question
arises to what extent unsustainable development can
or  should  qualify  as  development  at  all.  Given  our
definition in the introductory paragraph, development that
is  not  sustainable  would  reduce  the  ability  of  future
generations to develop further in the same areas as are
currently envisioned. A historical example for this situation
is  the  early  history  of  Cyprus  where  the  resident
population  developed  the  island's  abundant  copper
deposits by fuelling their smelters with the island's pine
forests.  Today  Cyprus  shows  neither  a  viable  copper
industry nor any substantial pine forests [24]. 
Contemporary  examples  of  unsustainable
'development'  include  the  numerous  incidences  of
regional  ecological  overshoot  where  populations
demand more resources and services than their region
can sustainably deliver. The inevitable consequence is
that future generations will find their options reduced
in  terms  of  some  or  most  of  the  ten  areas  of
development we referred to earlier: financial income,
employment  opportunities,  distribution  of  wealth,
education, political autonomy, basic needs for survival,
health of populations and ecosystems, equality, self-
esteem and dignity,  and freedom [25].  Fully half  of
our  sample  countries  fall  into  that  category.  A  well
known global example is the explosive expansion of
petroleum-based  industries  over  the  past  century,
bound to run its course within the next few decades
and  to  be  entered  in  history  as  the  peak  oil
phenomenon  [26-28].  While  it  lasted  it  brought
unprecedented  affluence  and  comfort  to  much  of
humanity;  however,  its  negative  long  term
consequences  are  likely  to  complicate  the  lives  of
many future generations. Whether peak oil should be
regarded  as  development  in  the  sense  of  our
definition  depends  entirely  on  the  observer's  time
frame. We must conclude that over the long term no
development in the true sense will  happen in those
examples.  Only  over  short  terms can  unsustainable
practices qualify as development, if at all.
Ignoring  the  risk  of  tautology,  authorities  have
invoked  'sustainable  development'  as  a  guiding
concept  at  least  since  the  Brundtland  report  [29];
certainly  no  administration  would  admit  to  its
development  policies as being unsustainable.  But  in
order to avoid the tautology, development needs to be
understood  as  any  measure  that  furthers  the
transition to sustainability, to a more inclusive respect
for  grantable  human  rights  (that  includes  future
generations) [30], and a general commitment to the
non-violent resolution of conflicts. 
The stated goals of the programs listed in Table 2
generally  emphasise  poverty  reduction  through
economic growth. Poverty provides the motive while
economic  growth  is  their  remedy  of  choice.  Thus
these programs represent chimaeras of disaster relief
and  development  aid,  set  on  alleviating  an
objectionable  situation  without  too  much  concern
about the long term implications of continuing growth,
or  about  any  limiting  variables  that  may  create
additional  problems over  the long  term. This  raises
the question how so many well-paid, highly educated
experts can persist in recommending such erroneous
courses  of  action  while  any  substantial  progress
towards sustainability continues to elude us.
5. Why Is Sustainable Development So Rare?
The finding that very few countries in our sample are
moving  towards  sustainability  according  to  this
analysis  (Burundi,  Liberia,  and possibly  Mozambique
appear  to  qualify)  seems tragic  though not  entirely
unexpected.  Too  many  development  program
documents seem to promise everything to everybody,
resembling  election  propaganda  more  than genuine
plans towards the enduring welfare of humanity. The
language  of  the  UN  document  on  indicators  of
sustainable development is devoid of any reference to
limits [31]. Another example are the UN's Millennium
Development Goals [32],  listed in Table 3. Likewise,
the Rio+20 United Nations Conference for Sustainable
Development  revealed  a  curious  combination  of
multidisciplinary analysis and inattention to limits [33].
This  widespread  bias  toward  wishful  thinking  has
ideological origins, which we will examine presently.
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Table 3. The Millennium Development Goals and Current Accomplishments ([32,35], adapted from [37]).
Goals Current accomplishments
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger On track to reach below the target of 
23% poverty rate
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education Some countries on track, others 
behind
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women Some progress in education, little in 
employment and political 
representation
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality Some regions on track, most 
developing countries behind
Goal 5: Improve maternal health Largely behind
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases Largely behind on HIV and malaria, on 
track for TB
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability Far behind, despite vague definitions
Goal 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development Mostly on track but definitions are 
confusing and contradictory
Following Singer's view [10], the MDGs emphasise
the  eradication  of  poverty  and  disease  as  implicit
moral  duties.  However,  explicitly  those  goals  are
framed as fulfilling an entitlement, the right to enjoy
'freedom from want' [34]. As we elaborated elsewhere
[25], the problem with such a right, while everyone is
of course free to claim it, is that no authority could
grant  it  to  the  more  than  seven  billion  people
inhabiting this planet at this time. The fact that the
MDGs make no mention of limits to growth implies a
worldview  that  considers  business  as  usual  not  as
problematic  but  as  extendable  into  the  indefinite
future. Only someone who believes that the Earth's
resources are unlimited can regard their allocation as
a universal right for an indefinitely large population;
and  only  someone  who  believes  that  the  world's
population and its impact have not even come close
to the Earth's carrying capacity will consider the goal
of eradicating epidemics to be realistic. In addition to
this fundamental flaw, the MDGs have been hampered
by a lack of political commitment and consensus, and
by the worldwide economic slowdown [35]. As Table 3
indicates, most of the MDGs are not being achieved
by their target date of 2015. Instead they are to be
replaced  by  a  new set  of  goals,  called  Sustainable
Development  Goals  (SDGs),  to  be  formulated  by
September 2013 [36]. 
An explanation for this discrepancy between wishful
thinking and practical failure must take into account
the  diversity  of  beliefs,  values,  and  ideals—often
summarised  as  ideologies—that  inform  people's
notions of what constitutes progress [38]. Sometimes
those notions create what Ronald Wright ([39], p. 8)
referred  to  as  'progress  traps'.  Of  particular
importance are those beliefs that delimit the realm of
the possible. An obvious example is cornucopianism,
the  belief  that  the  growth  of  populations  and
economies is not subject to physical limits [40]. Under
the  cornucopian  delusion,  progress  takes  a  very
distinct shape of unending growth in human numbers,
their consumption, and the quality of their lives. The
absence of any scientific justification for this belief has
relegated  it  to  the  realm  of  implicit  yet  powerful
assumptions  that  still  inform  certain  schools  of
academic  thought  such  as  neoclassical  economics
[41,42]. 
Some  of  the  listed  programs  for  sustainable
development  seem indicative  of  cornucopianism.  At
least  they  do  not  explicitly  acknowledge  limits  to
growth or local overshoot, nor do they tend to take
into  account  global  environmental  change  resulting
from the present situation of global overshoot. Many
rely on economic growth (usually measured as GDP
increase)  as  a  means  to  raise  income  levels  and
provide  trickle-down  benefits  from  investment,  the
large-scale extraction of non-renewable resources to
boost employment and trade balance, and converting
from subsistence agriculture  to  staple  industries  for
export.  Those  policies  are  supported  by  a  trust  in
global trade relationships and an optimistic outlook on
the  potential  of  market  forces,  complemented  by
some  regulation,  to  rectify  global  inequities  and  to
eliminate poverty worldwide. The future is envisioned
as a repetition of the past, only more of it. Raskin et
al. [43] referred to this ideology as the Conventional
Development Paradigm (CDP). 
The  well-publicised  manifestations  of  the  global
environmental crisis (under the broad phenomena of
climate change, pollution, resource scarcity, and the
loss of biodiversity), as well as the abundant evidence
for  its  anthropogenic  causation,  render  the  CDP  a
rather unrealistic kind of long term thinking. This is
the  kind  of  perspective  that  still  moves  people  to
welcome the discovery of new oil  deposits as good
news;  without  the  denial  of  anthropogenic  climate
change  such  news  would  be  received  with
ambivalence at best. It is also unrealistic because it
assumes  that  the  same  institutions,  regimes,  and
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ways of thinking that undoubtedly contributed to the
global  environmental  crisis  are  able  to  help  us
transcend it. This assumption can only be upheld if
one denies or disregards the true extent of the crisis.
It  makes  for  an  overly  simplistic,  laissez-faire  type
interpretation  of  sustainability  that  contradicts  the
bulk  of  the  evidence  reported  by  environmental
scientists.
While  those  ideological  deficiencies  provide  a
plausible explanation for the failures of the MDGs and
related development efforts, they do not explain their
sporadic successes, and they offer little help towards
finding  ways  out  of  the  conundrum.  Most  of  the
development programs listed here derive their support
partly from sources that are not as readily quantified
as  is  bioproductivity—human  ingenuity  and  spirit,
social  capital,  and  potential  for  learning.  Also,
ecological overshoot can proceed for quite some time
without the loss of natural capital necessarily causing
any  immediate  calamities  [44].  Thus,  development
that  is  unsustainable  can  continue  sometimes  for
generations before collapse becomes imminent.  This
undoubtedly  contributes  to  the  slowness  of  the
collective learning process, as do a diverse assortment
of  counterproductive  myths,  cognitive  biases,  moral
ineptitudes, and mental habits, all well characterised
in  the  literature  on  what  might  be  summarised  as
'human nature' [38,45-48]. 
6. A Utilitarian Theory of Development that 
Humanity Can Live With
The contingencies of overshoot render it unlikely that
the problems associated with underdevelopment can
be effectively remedied by efforts that only focus on
'eliminating  poverty'  as  the  humanitarian  ideal
demands—regardless  of  how  one  defines  poverty
[49,50]. Two reasons conspire towards this obstacle:
The first arises from the counterproductive effects of
further global economic growth under overshoot; they
necessitate  that  any  growth  in  a  poor  country  be
accompanied  by  restraint  in  a  rich  country—a
politically unlikely proposition. 
The  second  reason  lies  in  the  futility  of
redistribution efforts; at this point in time, if a global
dictatorship  allocated  exactly  equal  amounts  of
resources  to  every  human being,  we  would  still  all
starve,  albeit  rather  slowly  [25].  The  fact  that  our
current demand can only be sustainably met by about
1.5 planets means that even assuming perfect equity,
at  the  current  consumption  level  one  third  of
humanity  would  be  consuming  part  of  the  food
producing 'machinery' itself [19]. People living in more
extreme biogeographical regions and latitudes would
be  hardest  pressed.  Moreover,  population  growth
would still  proceed while food prices rise and fresh
water and soils grow scarcer [51]. This means that
the  redistribution  of  resources  cannot  be  the  sole
prescription for  food security,  even though it  would
certainly help alleviate some of the worst shortages. 
In order  to  ensure lasting environmental  security
and  acceptable survival  [52]  for  all,  humanity  must
reduce its  total  environmental  impact before nature
does this for us in very painful ways and before many
more species are lost. This imposes a tragic inversion
on  the  traditional  humanitarian  agenda  of
development.  What  is  inverted  here  is  nothing  less
than the holy grail of utilitarianism, often phrased as
'the  greatest  good  for  the  greatest  number'.  Our
collective environmental impact, described by the I =
PAT  relationship  [53],  clearly  indicates  a  range  of
solution states encompassing numerous combinations
of global population sizes and per capita affluence and
technology  use;  all  those  solution  states  are
sustainable  and  include  population  sizes  below  the
current level (how far below depends partly on how
long it will take us to get there). Furthermore, Potter's
[52] hierarchy of survival modes suggests that some
of  those  solutions  are  morally  preferable  to  others
(e.g.  miserable  survival  for  all  at  5  billion  vs.
acceptable survival  for all  at 3 billion).  Others (e.g.
[54,55,12])  have  come  to  similar  conclusions.  The
holy grail of utilitarians now amounts to the minimum
acceptable  amount  of  good  for  the  greatest
sustainable number. This number is probably no more
than about four billion people, and perhaps less than
one billion [55-57].
What  does  this  new  inverted  dictum  mean  for
development aid? The need to  reduce our numbers
does not only arise from our excessive impact.  The
growing  scarcity  of  key  resources,  particularly  food
and  potable  water,  causes  suffering  that  would  be
avoidable  with  a  smaller  population.  Cohen  [54,55]
framed the challenge of  global  food security  in  the
analogy  of  a  communal  dinner  table  where  some
guests go hungry; in his words, the problem can be
solved in three ways: (i) prepare a bigger dinner, (ii)
put  fewer  forks  on  the  table,  (iii)  teach  better
manners.  Ehrlich  and  coworkers  [58]  reduced  the
challenge  to  a  'race  between  the  stork  and  the
plough'.  Others (e.g. [59,60]) indicated that little,  if
any, room remains to increase food supply (i.e., speed
up the plough,  or  make a bigger dinner),  although
adherents to the CDP (e.g. in [49]) would disagree. In
effect,  reducing the global  population and changing
our  'manners'  are  probably  our  only  remaining
options. 
The link between the emancipation and education
of women and decreases in reproductive rates seems
well established cross-culturally. Several aid programs
in  our  sample include educational  components,  and
even  in  the  MDGs  this  opportunity  has  been
recognised under goal 3 (Table 3). Yet, as we pointed
out earlier, the need for population reduction is rarely
acknowledged explicitly. Family planning programs still
face the opposition of powerful religious and cultural
prejudices,  spearheaded  by  collusive  governments
[12].  It  is  also  clear  that  many  manifestations  of
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anthropogenic  global  environmental  change proceed
much too  quickly  at  this  stage  for  the documented
reductions  in  fertility  (or  the  much  invoked
demographic transitions to result from them) to effect
any  significant  mitigation.  This  means  that  both
environmental  deterioration  and  population  growth
will  proceed,  albeit  perhaps  at  reduced  speeds,
towards  the  inevitable  collision  point  at  which  time
much of international aid will need to take the form of
disaster relief.
As for our 'manners',  one aspect of development
aid  that  could  certainly  benefit  from revision is  the
lack  of  honesty  associated  with  using  the  label  of
sustainable  development.  As  we  established  earlier,
development that  is  truly sustainable must  fulfil  the
requirement  of  addressing  the  challenges  of
population, distributional inequities, and overshoot. In
that  sense,  'manners'  include  ethical  standards  and
dominant  belief  systems  that  bar  the  way  towards
gains  in  efficiency,  restraint  in  consumption,
adaptation  to  inevitable  changes,  and  conducive
structural  reforms.  In  all  those  directions,  too,
reformed  education  can  make  substantial
contributions [38] and pave the way for a proliferation
in 'positive deviance' in Parkin's [61] sense. While she
applied her norms of 'sustainability-literate leadership'
mainly  to  individuals  and sociocultural  communities,
our conclusions suggest that  they would be equally
beneficial among the international community.
Such deviance is necessary because it seems clear
that  development  initiatives  that  are  primarily
informed by the CDP can only help in the short term
(as evident in GDP increases). In the longer term they
will  do  more  harm  than  good  by  reducing  natural
capital as evident in decreases of other statistics (e.g.
the  Inclusive  Wealth  Indicator,  IWI)  and  increasing
humanity's  collective  impact  [62].  Rising  GDP  and
shrinking  IWI  have  been  observed  with  some
'emerging  economies'  such  as  Brazil  and  India.
Another case in point is  the much acclaimed 'green
revolution' that vastly boosted food production during
the 1970s. In the short term it relieved shortages and
prevented  impending  famines;  in  the  long  term,
however, it will be regarded a disaster, as Hardin [11]
predicted.  The  couple  of  decades  of  time  that  it
bought us were not used wisely; instead, they were
squandered on further growth under the belief that
this revolution would never end. Now we are again
facing  famines—except  that  our  numbers  have
doubled,  our  ecosystems  are  weaker,  tens  of
thousands  of  species  have  disappeared,  natural
resources  are  further  depleted,  and global  pollution
has  become  worse.  No  other  misadventure  of
conventional development policy illustrates the failings
of  the CDP better  than this  missed opportunity.  Its
humanitarian goals  are rendered unattainable by its
obsession with 'economic growth' as a human 'need'.
In  the  light  of  our  earlier  conclusions  such  policies
should not qualify as development proper. Not even
Sen's [2] more flexible  principle of  'development as
freedom'  is  able  to  accommodate  ecological
constraints  or  bring  humanity  closer  to  the  new
utilitarian  ideal  of  minimum  acceptable  amount  of
good for the greatest sustainable number. 
Utilitarian  reinterpretations  of  development
sometimes  meet  with  objections  based  on  human
rights  [63].  Rights  become  limited  by  a  partial
contradiction  in  the  sense  that  insisting  on  some
rights (i.e., rights that are not grantable) will create
insecurity.  In  her  critique  of  human  rights  theory
Thomas [64]  referred primarily  to the enshrining of
property rights under human rights law, which can,
under  conditions  of  limited  resources,  work  at  the
expense of disenfranchised minorities. In the light of
overshoot certain other human rights seem similarly
counterproductive,  such  as  the  right  to  a  'clean
environment',  'safe  drinking  water',  or  'adequate
nutrition'.  Given  a  large  enough  global  population
(today's seven billion plus would qualify) and a single
planet  at  our  disposal,  no  world  government  could
grant such privileges to all. One additional 'right' that
has arguably proven not only ungrantable but outright
harmful is the right to procreate at will [25]. 
This  need for  changing  our  notions  about  rights
points to those challenges that are situated inside the
human psyche. By labeling nature as the non-human
'other',  an  inanimate  heap  of  'resources'  for  the
taking,  consisting  of  marvellously  useful  little
automatons  just  waiting  to  prove  their  utility  to
human endeavours, we ultimately set ourselves up for
moral  bankruptcy  and  ecological  suicide.  What
emerges  are  not  just  the  deeply  problematic
ramifications  of  the  dominant  anthropocentric
environmental  ethic  behind  such  development
schemes as the UN's Millennium Goals, but a thorough
revision of what it  means to be 'modern' and what
constitutes 'progress'.
Besides  the obvious  need to  change  our  notions
about  human  security,  about  nature,  and  about
modernity, another internal challenge that is evident
from the foregoing is the need to change our value
priorities  with  respect  to  each  other.  As  ecologies
simplify and economies falter, centralised governance
and the rule of law will become more tenuous. Thus,
global development in the true sense means not only
that  most  of  us  need to  re-learn  how to  run  self-
sufficient,  resilient  local  communities.  It  also means
that  we  exercise  compassion  for  those  whom  the
crisis  will  have  displaced  from their  homes.  On  10
January 2012 the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist once
more  reset  its  Doomsday  Clock  closer  to  midnight,
citing dangers of nuclear proliferation, climate change,
and the failure of political leaders to change 'business
as usual' and to “set the stage for global reductions”
([65,  p.  3).  The  ranks  of  displaced  multitudes  are
certain to swell once rising sea levels have inundated
some of the world's heavily populated coastal lands
[66].  In  the  absence  of  decisive  initiative  by  the
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UNHCR that would impart on environmental refugees
the  status  of  'world  citizens'  (or  at  the  very  least
accord them full official refugee status) [67], their fate
depends  on  the  charity  of  other  countries  and  on
charitable  NGOs—which,  in  the  midst  of  shortages
and  economic  downturns,  cannot  be  taken  for
granted. Clearly the human conscience represents as
important  a  'tipping  point'  as  do  geophysiological
variables.  Many  of  these  challenges  have  been
reiterated at  the  Planet  Under  Pressure  Conference
(March 2012) leading up to Rio+20 [68].
Since  sustainable  development  in  the  true  sense
must incorporate all of those changes it comes as no
surprise  that  so  little  of  it  is  in  evidence.  If  the
developed world's idealistic efforts at development aid
were really motivated by the urge to increase justice,
human  security,  and  well-being  globally  while
achieving the global transition to a sustainable world,
they would not hesitate to start at the top end and
reduce  the  obscene  levels  of  consumption  evident
there.  In  many  respects  that  would  be  an  easier
undertaking  than  encouraging  development  at  the
lower  end  without  also  promoting  net  growth.  Yet,
even if we end up not making use of any of those
opportunities  we  can  be  assured  that  sustainability
will come our way eventually at the hands of mother
nature. 
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